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[Crim. No. 7590. In Bank. May 26, 1965.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RICHARD 
MARCELLUS DAVIS, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] CrimiD.al Law-Evidence-Oonfessions-Admissibility.-In a 
murder prosecution, defendant's confession and his diagram 
of the murder scene were inadmissible where, at the time his 
statement was recorded, he was under arrest, the investigation 
had focused on him, the purpose of the interrogation was to 
elicit a confession, and there was no showing that he was 
allowed to see counsel, that he effectively waived this right, or 
that he was informed of his right to remain silent. 
IS] Id.-Appeal-lr.eserviDg Questions-Evidenee-Admissions.-
Where a murder case was tried before the decision in 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 464; [2] Criminal 
Law, § 1080(2); [3] Criminal Law, § 1382(27); [4, 5] Homicide, 
§ 118; [6, 7, 10] Criminal Law, § 556; [8] Criminal Law, 1558; 
[9] Words azul Phrases. 
) 792 PEOPLE V. DAVIS [62 C.2d 
Escobedo v. nUnois, 378 U.S. 478 [84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 
977], defendant's failure to object to the admission of his 
confession and his diagram of the murder scene absent advice 
on his constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent, 
does not preclude his raising the question on appeal. 
[8] Id. - Appeal- Reversible Error - Evidence - Oonfessions.-
Though defendant in a murder prosecution testified to commit-
ting the same acts to which he confessed in a statement 
obtained from him by the police without first advising him 
of his constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent, 
the error in admitting his confession resulted in a miscarriage 
of justice where his testimony was not only impelled by the 
erroneous admission of his confession, but the confession also 
rebutted his defense that he was guilty of no more than second 
degree murder, making it reasonably probable that a result 
more favorable to defendant would have been reached absent 
the error. 
{4] Bomicide-Evidence-Motion Picture.-Wh-ere a motion pic-
ture of the victim of a gruesome murder is offered in evidence, 
the court must determine its admissibility by weighing its 
probative value against the danger of prejudice. 
[6] Id.-Evidence-Documentary Evidence.-In a murder case 
involving the defense that defendant killed the victim in a 
heat of passion because he had read notebooks containing notes 
passed between his wife and the victim which convinced him 
that th-ey had been practicing Lesbians, it was not an abuse 
of discretion to refuse to admit the entire notebooks on the 
ground that the great bulk of the material was irrelevant and 
immaterial where defendant was allowed to present the 
passages he considered relevant, as circumstantial evidence of 
his state of mind. 
16a-6c] Oriminal Law-Evidence-Expert Witnesses-Qualifica-
tions.-In a murder case where the defense attempted to prove 
by two psychologists that defendant suffered from a tempo-
rary functional psychosis that made him legally insane, and 
psychiatric experts for the prosecution denied such a disability 
could exist, the trial court erred in ruling that only one with 
medical training could testify on the issue. 
[7] Id.-Evidence-Expert Witnesses-Qualifications.-A witness 
is qualified to testify about a matter calling for an expert 
opinion if his peculiar skill, training, or experience enable him 
to form an opinion that will be useful to the jury. (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1870, subd. 9.) 
[4] See Oal.Jur.2d, Evidence, §§ 226-230; Am.Jur., Homicide 
(1st ed § 451). 
[6] See Oal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 293; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st ed 
§ 783). 
) 
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[8] Id.-Evidence-Expert Witnesses Qua.1i1lca.tions. - Though 
determination of the qualification of a proffered witness is 
ordinarily within the trial court's discretion, the standards 
used in the exercise of this discretion, like other questions of 
law, are subject to review. 
[9] Words and Phrases - cTunctionaJ Disorder." - A functional 
disorder is, by definition, nonorganic and without a biological 
cause. 
[10] Oriminal Law-Evidence-Expert Witnesses-Qualifica.tions. 
Not all psychologists are competent to give an expert opinion 
on sanity; whether a psychologist qualifies as an expert on 
sanity in a particular case depends on the facts of that ease, 
the questions propounded to the witness, and his peculiar 
qualifications. 
APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County. William P. Mabedy, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing 
the death penalty reversed solely on the constitutional ground 
announced in People v. Dorado, ante, p. 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 
169, 398 P.2d 361]. 
J. Perry Langford, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch, Attorneys General, 
William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Norman 
H. Sokolow, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant killed his victim, Marion 
Burnett, by pounding her on the head and arms six or more 
times with a 16%-pound stone. A jury found him guilty of 
murder of the first degree and sane at the time of the crime, 
and fixed his penalty at death. This appeal is automatic. 
(Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 
Defendant's wife of six months, Dorothy. left him and 
moved to her mother's house four days before the killing. 
Defendant had asked her several times to return. She always 
refused, in part apparently because of her belief that he was 
having sexual relations with her unmarried friend, Marion. 
Defendant had admitted to her that he had once engaged in 
794 PEOPLE tI. DAVIS [62 C.2d 
sexual intercourse with Marion. Dorothy and Marion, how-
ever, remained close friends. 
On the night of the killing, defendant went to his mother-
in-law's home to attempt again to persuade Dorothy to return 
to him. Dorothy and Marion were there together, but were 
leaving to go to Marion's home. When Dorothy remarked 
that he arrived just as Marion was leaving, defendant became 
angry and left. He walked across the street toward his home, 
ran after he turned a corner, and headed toward Marion '8 
home. When he arrived at the street on which Marion lived, 
he crossed the street and picked up a large stone. He re-
crossed the street and hid behind a hedge near the sidewalk. 
Several minutes later, Marion appeared alone. Defendant 
advanced toward her, she turned to face him, and he beat her. 
repeatedly with the stone. He then ran, threw the stone into 
a bush, and returned to his home to join a game of dominoes. 
An autopsy revealed that Marion was pregnant when she died. 
At the trial on the issue of guilt, the prosecution sought to 
prove that defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree 
on the grounds that the killing was premeditated and delib-
erate and was perpetrated by lying in wait. (Pen. Code, 
§ 189.) The prosecution argued as follows: Defendantre-
garded Marion as the obstacle to his reconciliation with his 
wife. He may even have been carrying on an affair with 
Marion that he wished to terminate, particularly because of 
Marion's pregnancy. He decided early in the evening to kill 
Marion, or at least to injure her. When the opportunity arose, 
he ran ahead of her, secured a weapon, and then waited behind 
the hedge to attack her. 
The defendant testified that he had intercourse with Marion 
only once, while he was drunk, and had no emission. He 
denied knowing of her pregnancy before he killed her. He 
presented a witness who testified that Marion accused the wit-
ness of being the father of her expected child. Defendant 
also testified that he thought both women would pass the hedge 
on their way to Marion's home. His defense was based on 
three, interrelated theories: 
(1) Defendant claimed that the killing was not premedi-
tated. When he hid behind the hedge, he expected both women 
to pass and he wanted only to scare or talk to them. When 
Marion passed alone, defendant emerged from his hiding place. 
She turned to him and he hid his face behind the stone. He 
stated, "I didn't want to hit her at first but I didn't know 
she couldn't have seen me. I kept thinking . . . if I don't 
) 
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she will tell Dorothy that I tried to or something and she might 
leave me." He then hit Marion on the forehead, she raised 
her arms in defense and screamed l and he hit her several more 
times. 
(2) Defendant claimed that the killing was committed in a 
heat of passion. Several days before the killing, he read some 
notes, passed between Dorothy, Marion, and a third girl in 
high school the previous year, that convinced him that the girls 
had been practicing Lesbians. Because Marion and Dorothy 
were still friendly and were often together, defendant thought 
their relationship was another reason for Dorothy's leaving 
him. When Dorothy linked him with Marion on the night 
of the killing, he became incensed. When he later encountered' 
Marion, he killed her in a heat of passion. 
(3) Defendant claimed that he did not have the mental 
capacity at the time of the killing to premeditate and deliber-
ate. A clinical psychologist, Dr. Robert G. Kaplan, testified 
that defendant was suffering from a temporary functional 
psychosis at the time of the killing and was incapable of wilful 
premeditation and deliberation. 
To prove premeditation and deliberation and also to show 
the circumstances under which the killing was committed, the 
prosecution introduced a full, corrected, and signed statement 
made by defendant to the San Diego police. A diagram of 
the murder scene made by him was also introduced. [1] De-
fendant was arrested before noon two days after the killing. 
He was interrogated continuously by various police officers 
until, at 8 0 'clock that evening he made the statemept, re-
corded by a police stenographer, that was introduced against 
him. He made the diagram the next morning. Since the record 
does not show what the officers said to defendant and what 
he said to them before he made the recorded statement, it 
does not appear at what point the investigation began to 
focus on him. It is clear, however, that by the time the 
recorded statement was commenced, the investigation had 
focused on defendant and the purpose of the interrogation 
was to elicit a confession. Although defendant talked to his 
wife several times before making either the statement or the 
diagram, there was no showing that he was allowed to see 
counsel, that he had effectively waived his right to counsel, 
or that he was informed of his right to remain silent. Under 
these circumstances the statement and the diagram were 
inadmissible by virtue of the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [848.Ct. 
796 PEOPLE 1). DAVIS [62 C.2d 
1768, 12 L.Ed.2d 977]. (People v. Dorado, ante, p. 33S 
[42 CalRptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361]; People v. Stewart, aflte, 
pp. 571, 576-581 [43 CalRptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97]; People 
v. Lilliock, ante, pp. 618, 621 [43 Cal.Rptr. 699,401 P.2d 4]; 
see also Clifton v. United States, 341 F.2d 649; Galarza Cruz 
v. Delgado, 233 F.Supp. 944; State v. Dufour, -- R.I. --
[206 A.2d 82, 85] ; State v. Neely, -- Ore. -- [398 P.2d 
482].) [2] Moreover, since this case was tried before the 
Escobedo decision, defendant's failure to object to the ad-
mission of the statement and the diagram into evidence does , 
not preclude his raising the question on appeal. (People v. 
Hillery, ante, pp. 692, 711 [44 Cal.Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 382] 
and cases cited.) 
[8] It is contended, however, that since defendant took 
the stand and testified to committing the same acts he con-
fessed to committing in his statement, we should make an 
exception to the rule that the erroneous admission of a con-
fession into evidence is necessarily prejudicial. (See People 
v. Dorado, ante, pp. 338, 356-357 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 
P.2d 361]; People v. Stewarl, ante, pp. 571, 681 [43 Cal. 
Rptr. 201,400 P.2d 97].) When defendant testi1ied, however, 
the only substantial evidence that had been introduced con- i 
. necting him with the crime was his statement and diagram. 
-His testimony was therefore impelled by the erroneous admis-
sion of that evidence and cannot be segregated therefrom to 
.. sustain the jUdgment. (People v. Dizon, 46 Cal.2d 456, 468 
1296 P.2d 557] ; People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal.2d 460, 463 -[34 Cal. 
Rptr. 863, 386 P.2d 487]; see also People v. Mickelson, 59 
Cal.2d 448, 449 [30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658].) 
Moreover, defendant's testimony at the trial was substan-
tially less incriminating than his confession to the officers. 
Defendant testi1ied that he did not lie in wait to harm his 
victim or his wife but only intended to scare or talk to them 
and that he decided to hit Marion with the rock only after 
she appeared alone and recognized him. If believed, this 
testimony would have supported a finding of second rather 
than first degree murder, and to rebut it the prosecution 
relied on evidence of premeditation contained in defendant's 
statement. In questioning defendant the officers were careful 
to probe for such evidence, l and in his argument to the jury 
1" Q. To go baek to the evening hours of the 4th, you made quite a 
point of asking your brother-in-law what time it was' A. I didn't ask 
him what time it was, I asked him was that eloek right. Q. What was 
your reason' A. At the time I was on the verge of thinking of doing it 
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the prosecutor stressed its importance to show that the killing 
was premeditated. He pointed out that" Down at the police 
station before he talked to a lawyer, before he had. time to 
learn about the differences in penalties between different 
degrees of murder, manslaughter, he was relatively frank 
with the police and he said a number of things, which I 
think should help us figure out-help us to confirm in our 
opinions the fact that he had planned this, the fact that he 
had been thinking about it for some time.... So he admits 
to the police before he had acquired sophistication of learn-
ing that murder isn't just murder, it is of varying degrees 
and varying types and varying punishments, back then he 
admits that he began thinking of getting rid of Dorothy 
and Marion, way back at 7:00 0 'clock. ... " 
Even if we assume that in some cases a testimonial con-
fession can make harmless the erroneous admission of an 
extrajudicial confession, defendant's testimony in this case 
did not do so. His testimony was not only impelled by the 
erroneous admission of the extrajudicial confession, but would 
have supported a verdict of second degree murder. The 
erroneously admitted confession rebutted his defense that 
he was guilty of no more than second degree murder. Whether 
or not its admission into evidence was necessarily prejudicial, 
it is reasonably probable that had it been excluded, a result 
more favorable to defendant would have been reached. Ac-
cordingly, the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. 
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 43h; People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 
886 [299 P.2d 245].) 
Other questions remain that may arise on retrial. 
[4] A motion picture :film. of the victim at the scene of 
when you say you were 'thinking of doing it" A. I mean hitting 
Marion. I was thinking about the domino game too; they said they 
would be there around that time. Q. Were you thinking in terms of an 
alibi' A. Not then, no. Q. Why did you want to hurt Marion' 
A. Actually, I didn't want to hurt Marion alone. I would hurt Marion 
or Dorothy or anybody at the time that was with them ..•. " Later, 
after a rambling, nonresponsive answer to a question, the interview con-
tinued: "Q. The original question was-- A. I know. Q. You are 
building up to why and when you decided to do this. It has been kind 
of a long explanation and I wondered if we lost the point. We were up 
to Tuesday night. A. Around 7 :00 I had just come from the park, play-
ing basketball. I got to the record shop on Milbrae and Oeeanview. 
Dorothy was standing out there. Again I asked if she was sure she was 
coming back. She said she didn't know, maybe. She mentioned Marion 
again. Q. That you and Marion were having an affair' A. Yes, she still 
thought I was. She wasn't too sure. I told her it was just one time. 
That's when I thought mnybe if I could get rid of Dorothy or Marion, or 
hurt Dorothy or Marion, I could get it off my mind." 
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the killing was admitted over defendant's objection. It ap-
pears on the face of the record2 that the court failed to "weigh 
the probative value of the' photographs in resolving a ma-
terial issue as against the danger of prejudice to the defend-
ant through needless arousal of the passions of the jurors." 
(People v. Ford, 60 Ca1.2d 772, 801 [36 Cal.Rptr. 620, 388 
P .2d 892].) If the motion picture is offered in evidence on 
retrial, the court must determine its admissibility by weighing 
its probative value against the danger of prejudice. 
[6] The notes that convinced defendant of the homo-
sexuality of his wife and the victim were written in three 
high school notebooks. Defendant contends that the note-
books should have been admitted in their entirety. Defend-
ant testified that he learned of the girls' homosexual relation-
ship by reading the entire notebooks. Upon request of the 
prosecution, defendant marked the passages that indicated 
such a relationship to him. The defense was allowed to read 
these passages to the jury; some 16 passages from various 
"notes were read, and most were reread by defense counsel 
in his closing argument. The trial court refused, however, 
to allow the notebooks to be introduced because the great 
bulk of the material in them was irrelevant and immaterial. 
Although the passages read from the notebooks were not 
used as hearsay, but as circumstantial evidence of defend-
ant's state of mind (see People v. Marsh, 58 Cal.2d 732, 737-
740 [26 Cal.Rptr. 300, 376 P.2d 300] ; 6 Wigmore, Evidence 
(3d ed.) § 1789; 2 id., § 740), these passages were apparently 
only a small part of the three notebooks. Defendant was 
allowed to present whatever passages he considered relevant, 
and he has not shown that their probative value would ~e 
t>nhanced by reading the rest of the DoteS. There was there- 1 
fore no abuse of discretion in refusing to admit the entire· "I' 
notebooks. "~ 
At the trial on the issue of sanity, defendant sought to 
establish that he was suffering from a transitory or temporary 
functional psychosis at the time of the killing and was insane. 
Two psychiatrists testified for the prosecution that defend-
ant was sane at the time of the killing and that temporary 
psychoses are never functional in nature. Dr. Robert G. 
KapJan, a clinical psychologist who also testified at the trial 
on the issue of guilt, testified for the defense that because 
of a temporary functional psychosis at the time of the kill-
21n ruling on defendant's objection, the court stated: "Well, I ",iewed 
[the film) nnd I feel that while it is not pleasant to look at it is a legal 
exhibit and it is material for the purposes offered." 
) 
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, ing, defendant could not distinguish between right and wrong 
and did not know the nature and quality of his act. 
[6a] Dr. Richard E. Worthington was also called by the 
defense. Dr. Worthington testified on voir dire that he ob-
tained the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the University 
of Chicago in 1940 under the Committee on Human Develop-
ment, specializing in clinical psychology. Although he took 
the equivalent of about one year of medical school courses 
in physiology, neurology, and genetics, he did not attend 
medical school. He testified that he was "the fastest man 
to go through the University of Chicago"; he passed from 
freshman to Ph.D. in four and one-half years by taking three 
times the normal number of courses. He taught psychology 
. at the University of Chicago and Cornell University, and 
worked as a 'psychologist at the Menninger Foundation for 
two years. He has published articles dealing with a wide 
range of topics within the field of psychology. He was cer-
tified by the Psychology Examining Committee of the State 
Board of Medical Examiners in 1958 (see Bus. & Prof. Code, 
. § 2940 et seq.), and at the time of trial was vice chairman 
of that committee, which consists of eight members appointed 
by the Governor. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2910.) He was en-
gaged in private practice in San Diego primarily in the 
treatment of emotional disturbances. 
Dr. Worthington was excused by the court because of his 
lack of medical training. The court ruled that only a medical 
doctor is qualified to testify as an expert on the issue of sanity. a 
8The court's ruling was somewhat ambiguous. After questioning the 
witness concerning his medical training, the court simply stated: "The 
witness is not qualified as an expert on the subject of insanity under the 
rules, as I understand them, and that is it, period. The witness will be 
excused. " During argument on a motion for new trial, the court at-
tempted to clarify its position. "I didn't find, I invite your attention 
to this, I did not find that a psychologist, as such, would not be qualified 
and on the ease of the other man [Dr. Kaplan] I simply asked the ques-
tion, in the presence of the jury-to the District Attorney I may have 
gone so far as to say I had my doubts about his qualifications, and he 
said he had no objection to that man testifying, so he testified. Now, 
I still don't think it is proper and you could argue all day and I wouldn't 
ehange my ruling. . . . Here is a man that comes in, glib of tongue, 
hasn't had a day's medical training at all and he is going to qualify 
as an expert on sanity, when a part of the mental condition of legal 
insanity, as we know it in California, is a medical proposition and I 
would like to see the Supreme Court tell me I am wrong. There is no 
use to argue that point any further. I am adamant in my opinion on 
that. " Despite the eourt's statement that it did not hold that a psyeholo-
gist as such is not qualified, it apparently based its exclusion of Dr. 
Worthington on the ground tha~ he did Dot have sufficient medical 
training., 
.• ~ 
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Defendant contends that this ruling was erroneous.4 ,: .. :., 
[1] A witness is qualified to testify about a matter calling 
for an expert opinion if his peculiar skill, training, or experi-
ence enable him to form an opinion that will be useful to 
the jury. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1870, subd. 9; Estate of 
Toomes, 54 Cal. 509, 514-515 [35 Am.Rep. 82]; Oakes v.' 
Chapman, 158 Cal.App.2d 78, 83-84 [322 P.2d 241]; Me-' 
Cormick, Evidence, § 13.) [8] Although the determina-. 
tion of the qualification of a proffered witness is ordinarily' 
within the discretion of the trial court (People v. Busch, 
56 Ca1.2d 868, 878 [16 Cal.Rptr. 898, 366 P.2d 314]; 2 Wig-
more, Evidence (3d ed.) § 561), the standards used in the. 
exercise of this discretion, like other questions of law, are 
subject to review. Recent cases considering the point have 
· held that a qualified psychologist can testify concerning 
a defendant's mental condition. (Jenkins v. United States, 
307 F.2d 637, 643-646; Hidden v. Mutual Life Ins. 00., 217 
F.2d 818, 821; People v. Hawthorne, 293 Mich. 15, 22-26'~ 
1291 N.W. 205]; State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 297-299 [347 
P.2d 312]; Watson v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 5, 8 [273 
S.W.2d 879]; cf. Oarter v. State (Okla. Crim. App.) 376 
P.2d 351, 359-360. But see Dobbs v. State, 191 Ark. 236, 
239-242 [85 S.W.2d 694]; cf.· State v. Gibson, 15 N.J. 384, 
391 [105 A.2d 1]. See generally Lassen, The Psychologist 48; 
an Expert Witness, 50 A.B.A.J. 239; Louisell,The Psycholo- , 
. .~ 
gist in Today', Legal World, 39 Minn.L.Rev. 235; Scheflen"~l 
· The Psychologist as a Witness, 32 Pa.B.A.Q. 329.} Manyj 
cases have also noted the use of psychologists in criminal cases "1 
.. ' without objection or comment. (E.g., p.,eople v. Busch, supra, /~'l 
· 56 Ca1.2d, at p. 875; People v. McNlchoZ, 100 Cal.App.2d .~ 
554, 558 [224 P.2d 21] ; United States v. Chancller, 12 F.Supp .. '<) 
230, 237; see also People v. Spigno, 156 Cal.App.2d 279, 288- ' 
291 [319 P.2d 458].) ':1; 
[6b] The defense attempted to prove through two psy- . 
chologists that defendant was suffering from a temporary .' 
4The prosecution did not object to the' use of Dr. Kaplan because his 
views had already been presented to the jury at the trial on the issue of 
guilt. The court, however, made the following comment to the jury on 
Dr. Kaplan's testimony: ttl will just simply instruct the jury that I 
don't know whether this witness is qualified either, because he holds no 
license to practice medicine, any kind of medicine in this state, he is not 
a psychiatrist and he is not licensed as such. • . . I may say this to the . 
. jury, that a lay person, like we are, may testify as to .•• our opinion 
as to the sanity of an individual if we are acquainted with him and with 
his habits of life. . . ." This comment also raised the question whether 
only a medical doctor is qualified as an expert on legal sanity. 
May 1965] PEOPLE tI. DAVIS 
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functional psychosis at the time of the crime that made him 
legally insane. The prosecution's psychiatric experts denied 
that such a disability could exist. Without the psychologists, 
therefore, defendant could not establish an insanity defense. 
The alleged disability did not involve a matter of mental 
illness completely within the realm of a physician. [9] A 
functional disorder is by definition nonorganic and without a 
biological cause. [6el The trial court erred in ruling that 
only one with medical training could testify on the issue. 
[10] It does not follow that all psychologists are compe-
tent to give an expert opinion on sanity. Many practicing 
psychologists are not concerned with problems of abnormal 
psychology and are not familiar with the clinical branch of 
their field. A certain level of training and experience is 
also necessary; one with only an undergraduate interest in 
psychology who has since pursued other fields would cer-
tainly not be qualified to give an expert opinion. (Cf. People 
. v. Chambers, 162 Cal.App.2d 215, 219-220 [328 P.2d 236].) 
Moreover, not all questions relating to legal sanity can be 
answered by a psychologist. (See 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d 
ed.) § 555, p. 634.) The interpretation of an electroencephalo-
gram or the physiological effect of drugs, for example, may 
be beyond the ken of a psychologist without medical training. 
Whether a psychologist qualifies as an expert on sanity in a 
particular case depends on the facts of that case, the ques-
tions propounded to the witness, and his peculiar qualifica-
tions . 
. The judgment is reversed. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J'J Peek, J.,Dooling, J.,- concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.. Dissenting. - In my view the evidence 
which was properly presented to the jury amply supports 
the verdicts as to guilt, sanity, and penalty. It must be recog-
nized, however, that under the present status of relevant law 
as developed in Escobedo v. IUinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [84 
S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977], and People v. Dorado (1965) 
ante, p. 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169,398 P.2d 361] (and made ap-
plicable ex post facto in favor of the accused and against the 
People), the prosecuting attorney, properly under the old law 
-Retired A880eiate Justiee of the Supreme Court sitting under assign· 
ment b7 the Chairman of the Judicial Couneil. 
, ., 
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but erroneously under the new, in his argument emphasized 
the difference between defendant's fact-statements as given 
before, and those given after, he had conferred with counsel 
and thereby "had acquired sophistication of learning that 
murder iBn't just murder, it is of varying degrees and varying 
types and varying punishments, ••. " 
The old rule looked with favor on ascertaining the truth; 
the new rule looks with more favor on giving the illiterate 
an equal opportunity with the literate to falsify to his own 
advantage. Thus must police and judicial skills in sorting 
.fact from fiction be developed the more; and thus will the 
practiced discernment of the trial judge-and of penal boards 
-probably have better opportunity to correctly recognize 
basic character and act accordingly. The difference between 
honesty and cupidity should not be overlooked. Enlightened 
perjury-or the giving of further opportunity to present it-
does not appeal to me as a basis for finding a miscarriage of 
justice. In the circumstances of this case I am not persuaded 
that the verdict and judgment work a miscarriage of justice. 
(See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4%; PeopZe v. Watson (1956) 
46 Ca1.2d 818, 835-836 [299 P.2d 243] [12].) 
I must also specifically dissent from the majority's holding 
. that the trial court erred as a matte,. of law in ruling that 
. .the witness, Richard E. Worthington, Ph.D. (he had taught 
psychology and treated emotional disturbances) was not 
qualified to testify helpfully as an expert witness on any 
material issue of fact then before the court. A trial judge's 
discretion in this area should be well-nigh absolute. He is in 
a position far superior to that of any appellate court to 
appraise the significance of evidence. An appellate judge 
can merely read' what a transcriber typed from. what a 
phonographic reporter's notes reflect of what the reporter 
believed he heard. Perhaps an electronic recording device 
also recorded on disc or tape the sounds of the courtroom. 
But human reporter or electronic impression get only sounds; 
the attentive trial judge sees as well as hears. And as f!fI1ery 
experienced trial judge knows, that which he sees may well 
be more truth revealing than that which he hears . 
..,- From my reading of the record I cannot conclude that 
the trial judge in his handling of this case was other than 
fair, competent, careful, patient and sound in all material 
rulings, including his denial of a motion for a new trial. 
For the reasons above stated I would affirm the judgment. 
KcComb, J., concurred. 
